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*
 
CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN
 
This article discusses the variety of ways state legal systems in the United States
treat cohabitation, both by same-sex and heterosexual couples. The different
approaches are described along a spectrum that ranges from one extreme, under
which cohabitants have essentially no rights against one another or against third
parties, to the other extreme, under which cohabitants are to be treated as
though they were married under state law. Different areas of law are discussed,
including the rights of cohabitants both against one another (remedies upon
dissolution, inheritance) and against third parties, such as state beneﬁts,
tort claims, health-related beneﬁts, and rights concerning children. The article
concludes with speculations concerning why the remedies offered to cohabitants
in the United States are so limited, as compared with other countries.
 
The legal treatment of cohabitation in the United States has been radically
and rapidly transformed during the ﬁrst few years of the twenty-ﬁrst
century. Two states (Vermont and Massachusetts) have now extended all
of the beneﬁts of marriage under state law to same-sex cohabitants, and
another (California) is poised to do so in January 2005. Other states and
localities offer variegated bundles of rights to cohabitants in domestic
partnerships, typically but not always excluding opposite-sex partners. There
are great regional variances—from Massachusetts, where marriage will become
available to same-sex couples in May 2004, to Nebraska, where the state
constitution was amended in 2000 to prohibit recognition not only of same-sex
marriage but also of civil unions or domestic partnerships of any sort (Neb
Const, Art I, § 29). Similar variety exists as to opposite-sex cohabitants. The
state of Washington grants many of the beneﬁts of marriage to all cohabitants,
both same- and opposite-sex, while Illinois extends no recognition at all to
cohabitants, for fear that to do so would somehow denigrate the institution
of marriage.
The terms of the public debate have also changed quite dramatically. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s ruling in November 2003 (
 
Goodridge v
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) that marriage must be extended to same-sex
couples produced a substantial backlash; and the discussion has become
increasingly polarized, with most politicians rushing to proclaim their allegi-
ance to protecting the sacred institution of marriage. What is astonishing,
however, is that the central question discussed now is whether the states are
free to grant all the privileges of marriage to same-sex couples, so long as they
are denied the appellation “marriage.” Leaving these matters to the states is
consistent with the assignment of family law to the states under the U.S. federal
system. The result is certain to be even greater regional variety than already
exists in the laws governing cohabitants, and increasing differences between
the treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex couples as well. Whether the
extension of beneﬁts to the former will ultimately hurt or help the latter
remains a question. Indeed, whether extension of marriage-like beneﬁts to gay
and lesbian couples is a ﬁrst step toward same-sex marriage or will function
to keep them permanently in a second-class status is also an open question.
This article attempts to make some sense of a legal situation that is in
vast ﬂux. The discussion concerns an issue of considerable social import-
ance. A major goal of family law—of the off-the-rack terms that states
provide for the governance of marriage and divorce—is the protection of
parties who have entered into long-term relationships of dependence and
interdependence—both economic and noneconomic—and of their children.
Moreover, ofﬁcial recognition of marital and family units serves to privatize
many welfare functions that might otherwise fall upon the state, such as
support of a dependent spouse at the end of a long marriage. Reﬂecting
these interdependencies, vulnerabilities and functions, the law extends a
variety of beneﬁts to and imposes obligations upon couples in the ofﬁcially
sanctioned unions called marriage. 
Increasing numbers of people now live in cohabiting relationships that result
in similar dependencies. The 2000 Census showed that less than 25 percent
of U.S. households were traditional nuclear families, while the number of
households headed by unmarried partners had doubled during the decade
from 1990 to 2000 (Fields & Casper 2001: 3 ﬁg. 1). Unmarried partner house-
holds made up at least 5.2 percent of total households and included some
5.5 million people, 4.9 million in opposite-sex households (Simmons & O’Neill
2001: 7). Although unmarried-partner households had increased in all states,
the largest number were in California, and the highest percentage in Alaska
and Vermont (ibid.). Of those households, 41 percent included minor children
(Fields & Casper 2001: 13).
The lives of individuals living in these unmarried-partner households
become interdependent in ways that may render them extremely vulnerable
if, for example, the relationship ends. Although the debate over these issues
in the United States is often carried out in religious or moralistic language,
this is what is at stake: Will the legal system extend some or all of the protec-
tions inherent in marriage to the many persons whose living arrangements
are functionally similar to it?
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There is already some indication that courts and state legislatures have
begun to acknowledge the substantial role that unmarried couples play in
addressing the welfare needs of their citizens and in privatizing support.
Legislative ﬁndings set forth as a preamble to the New Jersey Domestic
Partnership Act (2003) make this connection explicit:
 
a. There are a signiﬁcant number of individuals in this State who choose to
live together in important personal, emotional and economic committed
relationships with another individual;
b. These familial relationships, which are known as domestic partnerships,
assist the State by their establishment of a private network of support for
the ﬁnancial, physical and emotional health of their participants;
c. Because of the material and other support that these familial relationships
provide to their participants, the Legislature believes that these mutually
supportive relationships should be formally recognized by statute, and that
certain rights and beneﬁts should be made available to individuals partici-
pating in them. (NJ Assembly Bill 3743, § 2 [2003])
 
This preamble succinctly summarizes the rationale behind extending the
beneﬁts and obligations of marriage to cohabitants who fall within the
qualifying characteristics of mutual caring and economic responsibility for
one another’s welfare. It acknowledges both the existence of substantial
numbers of cohabitants and the functions they perform for the state by priv-
atizing support for the welfare of its citizens, reaching the conclusion that
the state should therefore support these couples in their performance of
these functions. It is signiﬁcant that this conclusion was reached by a legis-
lature, and not forced upon it by a court. Although the New Jersey statute
does not follow through with all the beneﬁts necessary to fulﬁll its promise
and does not apply to most opposite-sex couples, the logic of extending
state recognition and support applies equally to all who have entered into
committed relationships of mutual support.
In the sections that follow I describe, ﬁrst, the ways in which U.S. law
sought to protect cohabiting couples in the past; some of these remedial
strategies still exist. I then present the immense variety of modern legal
approaches to cohabitants’ rights in the United States, describing approaches
that range from one extreme, where cohabitants have no rights against one
another or third parties, to the other extreme, under which cohabitants
are treated as though they were married for all purposes of state law.
Finally, I offer some conclusions about the instability of the diverse systems
that now exist, as well as speculations and recommendations for the future.
In discussing the various legal approaches to cohabitation, the extent to
which each approach addresses the family law functions described above
will be a central concern. Particular attention will be paid to the interaction
between the extension of rights to heterosexual and to same-sex cohab-
itants, and the theoretical bases for treating the two groups in similar or
different ways.
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I. PROTECTING COHABITANTS IN THE PAST
 
Prior to the development of modern doctrines protecting cohabitants, those
who lived together without beneﬁt of formal marriage were not totally bereft
of remedy. Some were protected by the doctrine of common-law marriage,
which provided a remedy for many long-term cohabitants in the event of
death or divorce and in relation to the receipt of government beneﬁts. The
beneﬁciaries were primarily women, and especially poor women, African
Americans, Mexican Americans and Native Americans (see Bowman 1996:
754–70). 
Common-law marriage, continuing the ancient tradition of informal mar-
riage, does not require solemnization or registration. Instead, heterosexual
cohabitants who agree to live as husband and wife and do so, holding
themselves out to the community as spouses, are treated as married for all
purposes under both state and federal law (see Clark 1988: 48, 50). Some
courts will infer the parties’ agreement simply from cohabitation and “holding
out” (see, e.g., 
 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v Johnson
 
 1982 at 361).
No particular period of time is required for the relationship to “ripen” into
marriage, so long as the couple are generally known in their community as
husband and wife.
Unlike countries in Europe, almost half of the states in the United States
recognized common-law marriage well into the twentieth century, and eleven
jurisdictions still do.
 
1
 
 Moreover, the doctrine is inﬂuential beyond the borders
of the states that recognize it. If a relationship ﬁts the criteria and was entered
into within a recognizing jurisdiction, the marriage will also be regarded as
valid in states that do not recognize common-law marriage (Clark 1988:
47, 57–59). Thus, if a couple were living in a common-law marriage in
Pennsylvania and then moved to New York, courts in New York State
would recognize the relationship for purposes, for example, of inheritance
or divorce.
Common-law marriage, in short, was a real marriage—just one entered
into in a different way. As such, it does not formally belong in a discussion
of the legal treatment of cohabitants. The doctrine functioned primarily to
protect women at the end of long relationships of dependence; if they qualiﬁed,
courts would grant them all the rights of a wife or widow. Thus common-law
marriage responded to the same types of legal dilemmas typically faced by
courts deciding cases about cohabitants’ rights, providing a remedy for women
who were, for example, abandoned by men for whom they had performed
domestic services for long periods or who were left penniless upon the death
of a long-term partner to whom they were never formally married. Interestingly,
common-law marriage, like gay marriage today, was also controversial on
the grounds that recognizing it would somehow denigrate the sanctity of
marriage (Bowman 1996: 736–37, 743–44). 
The common-law marriage doctrine appears to be nearing the end of its
useful career. Only eleven jurisdictions still recognize it, and it is under
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attack in some of them (see, e.g., 
 
PNC Bank v Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Bd
 
 2002). Moreover, fewer persons could take advantage of the
doctrine today. The status is available only to heterosexuals. Moreover,
with the increase in cohabitation, its increased visibility and acceptance, a
couple who are not married no longer feel the need to introduce themselves as
husband and wife and thus will not be able to establish the basic elements
of common-law marriage even in the states where it is still recognized.
Faced with cases in which great hardship might result from failure to
recognize a long-term relationship as a marriage, courts have applied a
number of other remedial doctrines. The only one that approaches the protec-
tions of formal marriage, however, is the putative spouse doctrine. Under
this doctrine, a party who in good faith believed herself (usually it was a
female in this position) to be married but was in fact not married because
of some irregularity affecting the validity of the marriage ceremony was
treated as though married. 
The case often used to illustrate this doctrine is that of Mr. Vargas, who
had a wife and children in one location and then went through a marriage
ceremony (invalid because of bigamy) with another woman, setting up a
separate household with her in another town; children were also born to
this marriage (
 
In re Estate of Vargas
 
 1974). Amazingly, neither woman
suspected the deception until Vargas died, when two widows claimed his
estate. The court deciding this matter held that the second Mrs. Vargas was
a putative spouse and split the estate between the two women. In short, the
second Mrs. Vargas was treated as Mr. Vargas’ widow although he had never
legally been her husband, a situation one cannot describe as a marriage of any
sort. The putative spouse is instead a remedial doctrine employed by courts to
address situations where innocent parties are harmed by their reliance upon
a long-term cohabitant.
In addition to the doctrines described above, courts have employed a number
of equitable doctrines to provide at least partial protection to vulnerable
cohabitants, most notably equitable restitution, constructive trust, and quantum
meruit (see, e.g., Ellman, Kurtz & Scott 1998: 959–60). The typical situation
under which one of these doctrines would be applied was when one cohabitant—
usually a woman—had invested a substantial amount in property accumulated
by a couple during their life together, for example, by contributing funds to
the down payment on a house or to a business which was titled in the other
cohabitant’s name. In these circumstances, courts may disgorge the amount
that had “unjustly enriched” the other party and return it to its original owner.
Of course, if the two had owned the real estate jointly or entered into a formal
business partnership, traditional legal remedies, such as partition, would
be available. 
If the disputes leading to appellate litigation are any indication, however,
one of the enduring characteristics of intimate cohabitation is a simple trust
that typically does not insist upon joint tenancy or a partnership contract,
even though the underlying facts may reﬂect such a relationship. Women,
 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
 
124
 
LAW & POLICY January 2004
 
in particular, freely contribute money and labor to the accumulation of a
couple’s property—property that would be jointly owned if they were married—
without insisting that their names be placed upon the deeds (see, e.g., 
 
Hewitt
v Hewitt 
 
1979; 
 
Ayala v Fox
 
 1990; 
 
Wilcox v Trautz
 
 1998). Equitable doctrines
available to address these situations can still be used in cohabitant cases today.
Unfortunately, the types of contributions and services that trigger application
of these equitable remedies must look very much like business arrangements
to be recognized—that is, the sorts of co-ownership or partnership two
individuals might enter into even if they were not cohabitants, especially
if they are men. The more typical sorts of contributions made by female
cohabitants—contributing to household expenses, including the mortgage,
or rendering services within the household or within the male partner’s
business—are almost invariably not compensated under these doctrines
upon the ending of the relationship (see Estin 2001: 1395). A variety of theories
are available to explain this, most of them derived from traditional, and highly
gendered, notions of marriage—for example, that services by a spouse are
offered gratuitously and that contributions to their common life beneﬁt both
parties to the relationship (ibid.: 1401–02; Weisberg & Appelton 2002: 439).
Thus if a long-term cohabitant is abandoned after many years of service as
a homemaker, the court is likely to see her services, somewhat contradictorily,
as both altruistic 
 
and
 
 as having been compensated by the fact that she was
also supported by and beneﬁted from the relationship (see, e.g., 
 
Marvin v
Marvin 
 
(
 
III
 
) 1981 at 558).
In short, prior to development of the modern law of cohabitants’ rights,
some protection for vulnerable parties was available; but it was inadequate
to protect the dependencies arising from long-term cohabitation and, in
particular, to compensate for the contributions typically made by female
cohabitants. To address these situations, within the last three decades many
states have adopted, either by case law or statute, a variety of protections for
cohabitants. Most of these are based upon contractual theories, but some
base the state’s legal treatment simply upon the status of cohabitation. The
immense variety of these provisions, and their continuing inadequacy to
protect the interests of most cohabitants, will be discussed in the section
that follows.
 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN LAW OF COHABITANTS’ RIGHTS
 
Over the last few decades, the legal treatment of cohabitation in the United
States has developed through several strands, some of which coexist uneasily
with one another in the same state. This section discusses each of those
strands, in the following order: (1) states in which cohabitants are given no
rights; (2) states in which cohabitants’ rights are based on contract; (3) states
that extend rights based upon the status of cohabitation, either by imposing
that status upon cohabitants at the termination of their relationships or by
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providing for entrance into civil unions or domestic partnerships; and (4) other
rights extended to cohabitants vis-à-vis third parties on a variety of bases.
The section concludes with a brief discussion of cohabitants’ rights pertaining
to children.
 
A. NO RIGHTS FOR COHABITANTS
 
Before the development of contractual and status-based remedies for cohab-
itants, the traditional position was that cohabitants simply had no rights
vis-à-vis one another or third parties. Three states—Illinois, Georgia,
 
2
 
 and
Louisiana—continue to adhere to this position (see Gordon 1998: 253–54).
 
Hewitt v Hewitt
 
 (1979), the case frequently used to illustrate the Illinois
position, is a stark one. Victoria and Robert Hewitt began cohabiting as
students at Grinnell College. Subsequently they moved to Illinois, where he
established a lucrative medical practice and she served as homemaker and
mother to their children, while assisting him in building his practice. After
ﬁfteen years, they separated. Apparently believing that they were married
(perhaps by common law), Victoria Hewitt sued for divorce. The court not
only dismissed the divorce action but also, when she amended to add causes
of action in contract and for equitable remedies, held that Mrs. Hewitt was
entitled to no remedy at all, neither property distribution nor alimony. To
give her any rights, the court reasoned, would be to denigrate the institution
of marriage and in effect bring back common-law marriage, which Illinois
had abolished in 1905 (
 
Hewitt
 
 1979 at 1209–11). In short, Mrs. Hewitt, after
a ﬁfteen-year period of reliance upon and contribution to the relationship,
was left without anything.
Although 
 
Hewitt
 
 was decided in 1979, it appears still to be alive and well
in Illinois. It was followed and, indeed, extended in 
 
Ayala v Fox
 
 (1990).
 
3
 
Illinois courts have also consistently refused to give any legal protection to
cohabitants in other contexts, turning down, for example, claims for loss of
consortium by cohabitants (
 
Medley v Strong
 
 1990) and holding that cohab-
itation may constitute appropriate grounds to remove children from the
custody of cohabiting parents (
 
Jarrett v Jarrett
 
 1980), all based on 
 
Hewitt
 
. 
The 
 
Hewitt
 
 court’s reasoning that extension of recognition to cohabitants
would somehow harm the institution of marriage is open to dispute. In
 
Hewitt
 
, protections for the female cohabitant were denied even though the
relationship was virtually identical to the most traditional of marriages, as
Mrs. Hewitt stayed home to raise their children and assist her partner in his
career. To deny property and support rights to cohabitants in a case like
that in fact creates an incentive to 
 
avoid
 
 marriage—Mr. Hewitt was able to
extract the beneﬁt of his partner’s contributions and get away with all the
couple’s accumulated wealth. 
In states like Illinois, it is risky for a cohabitant to make any investment
in a nonmarital relationship. As the leading cases show, the cohabitants
most likely to make such investments—either because they simply trust the
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men they love or because they do not have the bargaining power to insist
either upon marriage or even joint title for property—are women. The law’s
refusal to protect their investments leaves these women extremely vulnerable at
the termination of a cohabiting relationship. The men in these relationships
clearly beneﬁt from such a legal rule.
 
B. COHABITANTS’ RIGHTS BASED ON CONTRACT
 
With the exception of Illinois, Georgia and Louisiana, almost every state
will now recognize express contracts between cohabitants, especially if they
are written. This state of affairs required the breakthrough of the 
 
Marvin v
Marvin
 
 “palimony” case in 1976. Prior to that time, cohabitants’ contracts
were considered unenforceable because they rested upon “meretricious”
consideration, that is, the exchange of sex. The 
 
Marvin
 
 court, however, held
that cohabitants could enter into contracts with one another just as other
individuals could and, indeed, that the courts would enforce both written
and oral express contracts; in dicta the court also indicated that recovery
might be based upon contracts implied from the conduct of the parties and
a variety of equitable grounds as well (
 
Marvin I
 
 1976 at 122–23). 
Michelle Triola alleged that the well-known actor Lee Marvin had
entered into a contract to support her for the rest of her life, in return for
her service as his homemaker, entertainer and companion, and that she
had given up her own career to do so. When they separated after six years,
Marvin argued that such a contract was unenforceable under California law.
In 
 
Marvin I
 
, the court ruled against him on these grounds, thus establish-
ing the cause of action, and remanded, but in 
 
Marvin II
 
 found that no such
contract existed. Thus the 
 
Marvin
 
 case, which was attended by a great deal
of publicity, in fact resulted in no recovery at all for the plaintiff; it simply
established the principle that cohabitants’ rights in California could be
based upon express or implied contracts and that the consideration for
them could include homemaking services.
While many states have adopted the 
 
Marvin
 
 approach, other states reacted
with alarm to the long and messy 
 
Marvin
 
 litigation, especially because it
required the court to examine and weigh highly intimate details of the
couple’s relationship. The Illinois court in 
 
Hewitt
 
 declined to adopt similar
contract-based rights; other states moved to accept 
 
Marvin
 
 but to limit its
application. New York, for example, restricted 
 
Marvin
 
 rights to those based
on express contracts (
 
Morone v Morone
 
 1980). Minnesota and Texas went
further, passing Statutes of Frauds that require cohabitants’ contracts to be
in writing (see, e.g., Minn Stat §§ 513.075–513.076 [2002]). 
Indeed, the application of the 
 
Marvin
 
 case has been quite limited, even in
California. In a 1993 California appellate court decision that attracted a
good deal of attention, the court denied relief to a disabled woman after a
relationship of twenty-ﬁve years and two children (
 
Friedman v Friedman
 
1993; see also Ellman 2001: 1370–72). Terri and Elliott Friedman began to
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live together in 1967, when they were in their twenties, bought a house to
which they took title as husband and wife, signed joint tax returns, and
lived as a fairly conventional family, with Terri staying home to care for
their children and Elliott going to law school and prospering economically.
By the time she sued in 1992, however, Terri was disabled and could hardly
walk. The case seemed to be a good one for the application of 
 
Marvin
 
remedies; compared to 
 
Marvin
 
, the relationship was longer in term, more
conventional, and included the birth of children. Nonetheless, Elliott argued
that he had never made a commitment to support Terri if their relationship
terminated, and the court found that the couple’s course of conduct did not
support an implied contract to that effect. 
The outcome of the 
 
Friedman
 
 case leads one to question the efﬁcacy
of contract remedies in general, so long as one party denies the contract.
(Of course, if that were not so, that party would simply pay up and there
would be no litigation at all.) Oral contracts are notoriously difﬁcult to
prove. Moreover, in 
 
Friedman
 
 the proof of an implied contract was rejected
because the conduct of the parties did not speciﬁcally indicate an agreement
by Elliott to provide spousal support upon termination. From this out-
come, one may infer that cohabitants are only slightly more likely to obtain
“palimony” in California than in New York if the claim rests upon an implied
contract; and at least the courts in New York are more candid about dis-
allowing it. In fact, California courts are inconsistent in this respect, with
the result depending upon the discretion, and perhaps the personal prejudices,
of the judge.
This inconsistency has been especially notable in cases where gay or lesbian
cohabitants have sued for remedies upon dissolution of their relationships;
courts have been very reluctant to grant support rather than property distribu-
tion in such cases. Two cases illustrate this trend. In one, 
 
Jones v Daly
 
(1981), the lover-housekeeper-companion-cook alleged an oral agreement
by his deceased partner to support him for life. Because the promise
explicitly included a sexual component, by referring to his services as
(among other things) “lover,” the court refused to enforce it. By contrast, in
 
Whorton v Dillingham
 
 (1988), a gay lover sued for property acquired during
a relationship that had ended, alleging an oral agreement, yet the court
severed any allegations referring to his services as companion and lover
(which are, of course, implicit in all cohabitation contracts) and enforced the
contract based upon the plaintiff’s services as chauffeur, bodyguard, secretary
and business partner. As commentators have noted, neither court regarded
homemaking services as consideration for the contract; the only considera-
tion that counted was that which appeared to have monetary value (see,
e.g., Bullock 1992: 1048). This may reﬂect the fact that courts ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to envisage a male in the role of a homemaker (see Chambers 1996: 483–84)
or a more general distaste for same-sex cohabitant cases; but it does not derive
from 
 
Marvin
 
, in which compensation for homemaking services was approved
in gender-neutral terms. And again, as with the equitable remedies described
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above, the more like a “male” business deal, the more likely the service is to
be compensated.
A much more profound problem with the use of contract principles to
redress inequities that may arise on termination of a cohabiting relationship
is that cohabiting couples—like married couples—typically do not make
contracts; they simply proceed trusting that their relationship will endure and
that each party will treat the other fairly. One empirical study of Minnesota
residents who self-identiﬁed as being in a committed unmarried relationship
found that only 21 percent had written agreements about property; of these,
52.1 percent had a provision for dividing property if the relationship were
to end, but only 35.4 percent set up duties of support upon termination
(Robbennolt & Johnson 1999: 435–36, 439, 441). Most cohabitants simply
proceed under vague agreements to pool resources and make no provision
for remedies upon termination (Blumberg 1981: 1164–65).
It is hard to know what to make of the absence of a contract, whether to
infer a caring relationship that would have resulted in provisions for prop-
erty and support upon dissolution if the parties had thought to do so or to
infer that the parties (or at least one of them) intended not to undertake
such responsibility to one another. Much may depend upon the group of
cohabitants under consideration. Some couples, like the Friedmans, fall
into a cohabiting relationship that then persists, leaving them in circum-
stances neither would have envisaged when their union commenced. Terri
Friedman, for example, eventually gave up her goal of obtaining a college
degree because of the sickness of one of their children (
 
Friedman
 
 1993 at
895). Others may explicitly desire to stay unmarried because of objections
to involving state or church in their relationship but still intend a caring and
mutually supportive relationship. Or—the case most observers worry about—
one or both may speciﬁcally intend to avoid any monetary commitments to
one another. The implications of cohabitation are likely to differ for each
of these groups, thus affecting the expectations that accompanied their living
together and the likelihood of an implied contract between them. In short,
even though contracts between cohabitants are now enforceable in many
states, both the probability that such a contract can be proved and the
desirability of inferring one from the conduct of the parties may vary, with
the result that few cohabitants will in fact ﬁnd a remedy in contract for any
vulnerability they experience upon the ending of their relationship.
In sum, a contractual approach to cohabitants’ rights returns to them
the rights and remedies they would have had as individuals to enter into
contracts of various sorts with one another, in a sense commodifying their
relationships. The more the arrangement looks to the court like a business
deal, the more likely it is to be recognized and compensated. By contrast,
women’s traditional contributions to relationships continue to be under-
recognized and uncompensated. Although postrelationship support is the-
oretically available under a contract doctrine, it needs to have been a quite
explicit expectation of the parties. Thus contractual remedies may not protect
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the Victoria Hewitts and the Terri Friedmans of this world, whose partners either
never intended a caring and supportive relationship or—more likely—no
longer recall their earlier intentions at the acrimonious point when the rela-
tionship is ending.
Moreover, cohabitants’ rights based upon contract theories are severely
limited in scope, applying only to rights 
 
inter se
 
. That is, they are limited to
rights of the two parties vis-à-vis one another and cannot create any rights
against third parties. Thus, for example, inheritance, tort claims based on
injury to the relationship or government beneﬁts cannot be derived from a
theory of contract. For this, a status-based theory of cohabitants’ rights is
required, although some status-based laws may also not provide all of these
beneﬁts. Ironically, given the derivation in California of cohabitants’ rights
for gay and lesbian persons out of contract theories developed for the protec-
tion of heterosexuals, in 2005 same-sex cohabitants there will become eligible
for a broad range of beneﬁts, including not only property distribution and
support but also inheritance, standing in tort and government beneﬁts if they
are registered as domestic partners—a status unavailable to most heterosexuals
in that state. I turn now to discuss the current variety of status-based legal
approaches to cohabitation.
 
C. COHABITANTS’ RIGHTS BASED ON STATUS
 
Dissatisﬁed with many of the limitations of contract-based remedies, a
number of states have instead conferred rights upon cohabitants based
upon their status as such, an approach that was rejected by the 
 
Marvin
 
court (
 
Marvin I
 
 1976 at 119–22). Some of these remedies are available to
both opposite- and same-sex couples, although the more comprehensive
approaches are primarily limited to gay and lesbian couples, presumably
because marriage has not been an alternative for them. There are now four
general types of status-based regimes in the United States: (1) meretricious
relationships in Washington; (2) civil unions in Vermont and gay marriage
in Massachusetts; and (3) domestic partnerships in Hawaii, New Jersey and
California. An important distinction among them—one many think relevant
to the amount of backlash they occasion—is whether they have been initiated
by the judiciary or the legislature. In a sense, however, virtually all of these
arrangements have had their initial push from litigation, as states have
enacted domestic partnership laws in response to court decisions invalidating
the restriction of marriage to heterosexuals.
 
1.
 
Meretricious Relationships in Washington
 
4
 
The Washington Supreme Court rejected a contract approach to the thorny
legal issues presented upon dissolution of cohabitant relationships. Its
approach instead confers rights generally upon couples in what it calls a
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“meretricious relationship,” deﬁned as “a stable, marital-like relationship
where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between
them does not exist” (
 
Connell v Francisco
 
 1995 at 834; see also
 
 In re Marriage
of Lindsey
 
 1984 at 331). Upon dissolution or death, property of individuals
in such relationships which would have been community property if they were
married is to be divided between them in a just and equitable distribution.
Thus all income and property acquired by either party during the relationship
is presumed to be owned by both—a type of community property by analogy.
This legal rule, which protects vulnerable parties at the end of a relation-
ship if they have property to divide, has been extended to same-sex couples
(
 
Vasquez v Hawthorne
 
 2001).
The inquiry under a status-based cohabitant regime of this type is not
whether the couple had any kind of agreement for property or support at
dissolution or death (although their intent is relevant to the inquiry) but
rather whether their conduct ﬁts them into the deﬁnition of cohabitants.
The Washington court directed judges to consider the following factors,
among others, in making this determination (
 
Connell
 
 at 834, quoting 
 
Lindsey
 
at 331):
 
• continuous cohabitation
• duration of the relationship
• purpose of the relationship
• pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and
• the intent of the parties.
 
Unlike a contract-based system, the Washington approach, rather than assum-
ing (and encouraging) individual autonomy, presumes that a couple in such
a relationship is in fact a joint economic unit, thus encouraging the type of
sharing behavior typical of marriage. If a couple in a long-term unmarried
relationship do not wish to pool their income and undertake economic
responsibility for one another, they need to contract 
 
out
 
 of such obligations
in the state of Washington, unlike in California and other states follow-
ing 
 
Marvin
 
, where such obligations are undertaken by contracting 
 
in
 
.
Because registration is not required, Washington residents who are not
well-versed in the law may have an unpleasant surprise upon ending their
relationships.
Evaluating the status-based approach taken in Washington from the
touchstone of protection for vulnerable parties, it clearly improves upon
contract schemes in this respect, imposing upon cohabitants who have
become interdependent an obligation to share their property upon termina-
tion of the relationship without the necessity of proving a contract. Wash-
ington’s approach is limited in several ways, however. First, it only applies
to property distribution; so if the couple have not accumulated property, it
is worthless. Second, it pertains only to rights against one another, thus
excluding, for example, both standing for tort claims and the plethora of
government beneﬁts tied to marital status. Third, it is activated only upon
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termination of the relationship by dissolution or death; the pseudo-community
property does not attach during the relationship. 
The inclusion of property distribution upon death is nonetheless import-
ant. Except in New Hampshire, where long-term cohabitants may be given
inheritance rights under a form of common-law marriage applicable only at
death (NH Rev Stat Ann § 457: 39 [2001]), cohabitants have been excluded
from inheritance under the law of every state. Thus, unless they make wills,
which many do not,
 
5
 
 cohabitants receive no property upon the death of
their partners. Yet recent studies show that a majority of both heterosexual
and same-sex cohabitants prefer that a substantial share, if not all, of their
estates go to their surviving partners upon death (Fellows et al. 1998: 9).
Thus inheritance can be an important issue for cohabitants. It can be espe-
cially problematic for gay and lesbian couples, who may be alienated from
family members, who then contest a will leaving property to the cohabitant;
such will contests often succeed (Sherman 1981: 246). The desire to ensure
such rights has led some gay males to attempt to adopt one another in order
to obtain inheritance by a different route, but this approach is not available
in all states and the adoption may also be challenged by relatives (see, e.g.,
 
In re Adoption of Swanson
 
 1993; contra 
 
Matter of Adoption of Robert Paul
P.
 
 1984). Theoretically, of course, if the adoption is successful, the two could
risk prosecution for incest as well. If the two live in Washington, however,
the surviving partner may receive 50 percent of the total property accumulated
by the two during their relationship at his partner’s death.
In short, the approach taken in Washington provides some important,
though limited, protections to many individuals who have become econom-
ically interdependent in the course of a longstanding relationship. Although
now applicable in only a relatively small part of the United States, this is
the general approach recommended by the American Law Institute (ALI)
for adoption in all states.
 
6
 
 Under the ALI 
 
Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution
 
, the same rules that apply upon divorce of married persons are
to be applied to either same-sex or heterosexual cohabitants if they qualify
as “domestic partners” within the statute; those rules presume equal divi-
sion of property acquired during the relationship and also provide for com-
pensatory payments—alimony or spousal maintenance—to dependent parties
in long-term unions (ALI 2002: §§ 6.04–6.05, 4.09–4.10, 5.04). Individuals
are presumed to qualify either if they have cohabited continuously for a
state-deﬁned period and act jointly with respect to household management
or if they have a common child; if not, they are entitled to establish a
domestic partnership by proof of a number of factors having to do with
ﬁnancial interdependence, intimacy and reputation as a couple (ibid.: § 6.03;
see also Ertman 2001: 107–09). Although ALI formulations have been
inﬂuential upon state law in the past, thus far no state has moved to adopt
its most recent recommendations in this respect. 
The Washington scheme for meretricious relationships does not go as far
as the ALI suggests, because it is limited to property distribution and does
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not include provision for postrelationship support if there is no property to
distribute. It does offer, however, the most far-reaching protection available
thus far in the United States for heterosexual cohabitants. It is interesting
that the system is not very well-known—interesting because it has been in
place since 1984 (although not extended to gay and lesbian couples until
2001) yet apparently has not occasioned widespread public controversy.
This has not been the case when courts have moved to extend the rights of
marriage to couples of the same sex.
2. Civil Unions Versus Gay Marriage: Vermont and Massachusetts
Apart from the Washington approach described above, most status-based
cohabitation regimes in the United States have been created in response to
the pressure for same-sex marriage. Cases challenging the denial of mar-
riage licenses to gays and lesbians have been brought since the 1970s (Baker
v Nelson 1971; Jones v Hallahan 1973), but the ﬁrst to succeed was that in
Hawaii (Baehr v Lewin 1993). A variety of legal bases have been used for
these constitutional challenges. Sex discrimination was the successful ground
in Hawaii (either member of the couple could have obtained the license if
they were of the other sex), but only because the state constitution, unlike
the U.S. Constitution, included an Equal Rights Amendment. In Alaska, a
Superior Court case held that a fundamental right to choose one’s life partner
was contained within the state constitution’s clause guaranteeing the right
to privacy (Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics 1998). In both states, however, the
decision ﬁnding the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples unconstitu-
tional was quickly overturned by constitutional amendment (Hawaii Const,
Art I § 23; Alaska Const, Art I § 25).
When gay and lesbian couples challenged their exclusion from marriage
in Vermont, they met with a more favorable outcome, again linked to a unique
provision of the state’s constitution. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held,
under the state constitution’s Equal Beneﬁts Clause, that same-sex couples
could not be excluded from all the beneﬁts associated with marriage under
state law (Baker v State 1999). In response, the Vermont legislature passed
a statute recognizing an alternative status to marriage, styled “civil unions”
(15 Vt Stat Ann §§ 1201–1207 [Supp 2000]). Couples who register under this
law receive all the beneﬁts and protections of marriage under state law,
including, among other things, property rights, adoption, tax treatment,
insurance beneﬁts, spousal standing for tort and criminal law, hospital visita-
tion, and intestacy. No rights under federal law are available, however; and
heterosexual cohabitants are not eligible to enter into civil unions. Nonethe-
less, unlike the contractual and status-based remedies discussed thus far, the
beneﬁts of a civil union expand beyond those the parties have vis-à-vis one
another and include rights against third parties and the state.
In 2003, a same-sex marriage case made it to the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts (Goodridge I ). All of the arguments raised in other states
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were raised here as well—sex discrimination under the state’s equal rights
clause, as in Hawaii; the fundamental right to choose one’s partner, as in
Alaska; and the unconstitutionality of excluding one group from the state’s
beneﬁts, as in Vermont. The only thing that had changed since all of those
opinions was that the Supreme Court had invalidated laws criminalizing
sodomy (Lawrence v Texas 2003), so that states could no longer argue that
they were being asked to approve potentially criminal conduct.
The astonishing thing about Goodridge is that it was decided on none of
these grounds, but rather on the basis that there was simply no rational
reason for the state to exclude same-sex couples from the beneﬁts conferred
by the status of marriage. The argument came down, as in Vermont and
Hawaii, to the effects upon children; but the state’s position here, as in
Vermont, had been seriously compromised by its previous approval of
adoption by gays and lesbians. Indeed, the Goodridge court emphasized the
detriments to children already living in same-sex-parented families if these
unions are not recognized. As one commentator has remarked, in the
United States, unlike Western Europe, the courts had already recognized
gay and lesbian families; now it was being asked to recognize the same-sex
unions around which those families were structured (Harvard Law Review
2003: 2027).
In Massachusetts, as in Hawaii, Alaska and Vermont, the legislature met
to consider what to do in the wake of its supreme court’s decision. In
Hawaii and Alaska, the cases were not sufﬁciently advanced at the point of
decision to cut off the time necessary to pass a constitutional amendment
deﬁning marriage as a heterosexual institution, which both promptly did. In
Vermont, the state supreme court gave the legislature the option of con-
ferring all the beneﬁts of marriage without the status, and it did so. The
Massachusetts legislature asked for an Advisory Opinion from the court as
to whether establishing civil unions would comply with the court’s holding.
On February 3, 2004, the court replied that nothing short of marriage
would do (Goodridge II ). Moreover, the state was given only until May 17,
2004 to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, which does not
allow time for the passage of a constitutional amendment to overrule the
court (which is not possible to effect before 2006). Thus Massachusetts is
the ﬁrst state in the United States where same-sex marriage will be allowed.
One problem that has already become apparent from the Vermont expe-
rience, however, is that couples who enter into civil unions have trouble
obtaining “divorce” remedies and inheritance if they actually reside in or
move to other states that do not recognize the status (Bernstein 2003: 2).
This reﬂects the more general conﬂict of law problems attendant upon the
vastly differing treatment of cohabitants’ rights in different states (see
Reppy 2002: 303–11). For example, will a cohabitant couple moving from
Washington to California receive status-based rights upon dissolution? If
they move to Illinois? If recognition is against the state’s public policy, an
exception to the Full Faith and Credit referred to in the U.S. Constitution
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may excuse it from recognizing a status entered elsewhere (ibid.: 275).
Many states (more than thirty-ﬁve) and the federal government have also
passed either “Defense of Marriage” acts or constitutional amendments
providing that only marriages between opposite-sex partners will be recog-
nized (Developments 2003: 2006, 2014). The federal Defense of Marriage
Act also includes a provision to the effect that states are not required to
give Full Faith and Credit to same-sex marriages (28 USC § 1738C [2000]).
In contrast, the domestic partnership statutes recently passed by California
and New Jersey (discussed below) explicitly provide that civil unions or
domestic partnerships entered into in other jurisdictions where they are valid
will be recognized in those states (CA Assembly Bill 205, § 299.2 [2003]; NJ
AB 3743, § 6(c)).
The problems posed by conﬂict among the laws of different states will be
exacerbated by the availability of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, when
as will doubtless occur, Massachusetts residents joined in same-sex marriages
move to other states and then seek to dissolve their relationships. The legal
issues arising from the many conﬂicts posed will doubtless require lengthy
litigation to decide. In the meantime, there is a growing movement to pass
an amendment to the U.S. Constitution conﬁning the status of marriage
throughout the country to persons of the opposite sex. The amending process
is a slow one, however; and before it can be completed, numerous same-sex
couples will become legal spouses in Massachusetts, posing serious ques-
tions about whether they can be deprived of that status retroactively. 
The law governing interstate recognition of marriages is quite complex
and cannot be fully discussed here (see Developments 2003: 2028–51).
Whatever happens, however, cohabitants of the same sex in Vermont and
Massachusetts may now receive all the protections state law provides for
married couples, both during and upon termination of their relationships,
at least as long as they remain residents of the state.
3. Domestic Partnership Laws: Hawaii, New Jersey and California
The demand for equal beneﬁts has also resulted in a plethora of domestic
partnership schemes throughout the United States, often passed by muni-
cipal or county ordinances; many apply to heterosexuals as well as same-sex
cohabitants. Many such programs provide merely a system of registration
and dissolution, with no attendant beneﬁts except for municipal or county
employees, who may receive family leave, family medical insurance and
the like (Bowman & Cornish 1992: 1192). In California, for example, San
Francisco provided a partnership registry in 1989, granting cohabitants
hospital visitation rights, paid bereavement leave for city employees and health
insurance for the partners of city employees (Hein 2000: 35–37). In 1996
San Francisco also passed an ordinance requiring contractors doing business
with the city to extend beneﬁts to domestic partners of employees (ibid.).
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By contrast, in other states—Georgia, for example—similar municipal ordin-
ances have been overturned as ultra vires, that is, exceeding the authority
given to municipalities by the state (Christensen 1998: 1739; see also, e.g.,
City of Atlanta v McKinney 1995 at 520–21). Nonetheless, domestic partner-
ship ordinances have proliferated, driven in large part by a desire to obtain
employee beneﬁts. Eligibility to enter into such a status may be relatively
stringent, requiring nonrelationship, indeﬁnite commitment, common residence
and an agreement to joint responsibility for basic living expenses (Bowman &
Cornish 1992: 1192–95).
More recently, a number of statewide domestic partnership laws have ori-
ginated as a direct response to the litigation campaign for gay marriage. The
scenario in Hawaii is a good illustration. Although the Hawaii Supreme
Court’s decision in favor of same-sex marriage was overturned by constitu-
tional amendment, the legislature passed the Reciprocal Beneﬁciaries Act in
1997, giving couples excluded from the protections of marriage a few of
its beneﬁts (Hawaii Rev Stat §§ 572C-1 to -7 [1998]). Under the Act, couples
legally prohibited from marrying may register and then receive rights of
inheritance, workers’ compensation survivorship beneﬁts, health-related
beneﬁts such as hospital visitation rights, family leave and the right to make
health care decisions for a partner, the right to sue in tort for wrongful death
and the right to become beneﬁciaries of one another’s health and life insurance
policies (see Habegger 2000: 1002). Thus, the Hawaii statute gives cohab-
itants certain rights against third parties, but not against one another in
case they dissolve the relationship, which either party is free to do at will. While
in California and Washington rights for same-sex couples were derived
from those granted to opposite-sex couples, the motivation of the Hawaii
statute was clearly to beneﬁt gay and lesbian couples; but it includes beneﬁts
for a limited group of heterosexuals as well—any persons who are unable to
marry, thus covering, for example, mothers and their adult sons (or grandsons)
who share the same residence.
The relationship between the drive for gay marriage and domestic part-
nership laws has not been as direct in New Jersey and California as it was
in Hawaii, but it is still there. In New Jersey, a case challenging the exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage has been wending its way up through
the state courts (Lewis v Harris 2003). Without any State Supreme Court
decision on that question, however, the New Jersey legislature—apparently
inﬂuenced by the dilemmas of those who lost domestic partners on September
11, 2001—passed a Domestic Partnership Act in January 2004, unaccompanied
by any declaration that marriage was to be restricted to persons of the opposite
sex (NJ AB 3743). The Act, effective on passage, provides that same-sex
couples and heterosexual couples age sixty-two or older (who might lose
their full individual entitlement to Social Security beneﬁts from a former
spouse if they remarry) may ﬁll out an afﬁdavit of domestic partnership if
neither is married or has been in another domestic partnership dissolved
less than six months previously, the partners are not related to one another,
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and they share a common residence in the state, are jointly responsible for
each other’s common welfare (evidenced, for example, by joint ownership
of various assets), agree to be jointly responsible for each other’s basic living
expenses, and “have chosen to share each other’s lives in a committed rela-
tionship of mutual caring” (ibid.: § 4(b)). 
Partners ﬁling such an afﬁdavit in New Jersey receive exemption from
inheritance taxes and a limited state income tax deduction, along with
hospital visitation privileges, health care decision making, and employment
beneﬁts, such as health insurance coverage if they are state employees, and
broad protection against discrimination in relation to employment, housing
and credit. There are no other beneﬁts against third parties or the state, and
no provision for equitable property distribution or support on dissolution
of the relationship.
In contrast to domestic partnerships in Western Europe, domestic
partners in New Jersey are required to go through a judicial dissolution
proceeding to terminate their relationships, on grounds virtually identical to
those for divorce in that state (NJ Stat Ann 2A: 34-2 [2000]): 
• sexual intercourse with a person not the partner
• desertion for twelve months
• extreme cruelty
• separation of eighteen months with no reasonable prospect of reconciliation
• addiction or habitual drunkenness
• institutionalization for mental illness
• imprisonment
In short, domestic partnerships in New Jersey have quite stringent require-
ments for both entry and exit and very few beneﬁts (NJ AB 3743, § 10). It
will be interesting to see how many people ﬁnd the arrangement attractive.
The demand by gays and lesbians for marital status is very high in
California, although a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage was passed by
a public initiative (Proposition 22) in March 2000 (Defense of Marriage Act,
Cal Fam Code § 308.5 [2002]; Sawyer 2003: 733). Reﬂecting this demand,
when the mayor of San Francisco decided unilaterally to begin issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in February 2004, thousands of indi-
viduals lined up to be joined in marriage, provoking a lawsuit to enjoin the
practice as invalid under state law (Marshall 2004).7
In response to demand for equal beneﬁts, the California legislature
passed its ﬁrst domestic partnership law in 2001, under which both same-
sex cohabitants and heterosexual cohabitants over the age of sixty-two may
register (Domestic Partner Registration Act, Cal Family Code § 297 [2000]).
One of the factors leading to its passage was the highly publicized death of
Diane Whipple, who was mauled to death by a dog in the hallway of the
apartment she shared with her lesbian partner in San Francisco, and the
desire to allow persons in her partner’s situation to sue for wrongful death
and negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress (Gorback 2002: 275–77).
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Under the new partnership act, domestic partners received the right to sue
for these torts, as well as to make health care decisions for one another, to
receive sick leave and unemployment beneﬁts for reasons related to a partner,
to adopt a partner’s child as though a stepparent, and to administer a partner’s
estate (Sawyer 2003: 742–43). 
As in New Jersey, heterosexual couples are included in the California
domestic partnership statute if one member of the couple is over the age of
sixty-two. One commentator has described this as “marriage lite” for older
straight couples, allowing them to receive some beneﬁts of marriage
without losing rights that a surviving or divorced spouse would lose upon
remarriage (Oldham 2001: 1431). Because inheritance was not included in
this initial partnership law in California, registration as domestic partners
also did not interfere with older couples’ typical desire to leave their assets
to children of a previous relationship. However, inclusion of heterosexuals
over sixty-two in the statute is difﬁcult to explain from a theoretical stand-
point. There is no reason to believe that older cohabiting couples are more
interdependent than ones who are younger; indeed, they may be less so,
given the absence of children in common. The probable reason for including
this group of heterosexuals in a statute clearly intended to beneﬁt gay and
lesbian couples was simply to gain more widespread support for passage
of the legislation by extending the group who would beneﬁt from it (Callan
2003: 458). By the same token, however, the inclusion of some heterosexuals
within the statute may provide a wedge by which other opposite-sex couples
may challenge their exclusion in the future, perhaps with the support of the
sixty-two-plus set.
In September 2003 California passed a second partnership act, the Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, which is to go into effect in January
2005 (AB 205). In the meantime, currently registered domestic partners are
being given notice that as of that date the rights and obligations they have
toward one another will be radically changed if they do not opt out. The new
act will give the most extensive rights to cohabitants outside of Vermont and
Massachusetts; indeed, it will affect many more people, both because such
a large proportion of cohabitants live in California and because it includes
opposite-sex couples over the age of sixty-two.
The provisions of the new California act are simple:
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protection, and beneﬁts,
and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under
law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules,
government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law,
as are granted to and imposed upon spouses [or former spouses, widows and
widowers]. (Ibid.: §§ 297.5 (a)(b)(c)).
In short, a regime equivalent to marriage will become available to same-
sex and certain opposite-sex couples in California for all purposes of
state law, except joint ﬁling status on tax returns. Unlike comparable
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regimes in Vermont and Massachusetts, however, the new system was the
result of legislative action rather than stemming from a decision of the state’s
highest court.
As in New Jersey, the dissolution proceedings necessary to end such a
union under the new California Act are equivalent to divorce, but divorce
is available in California on pure no-fault grounds. As under California
divorce law, a summary procedure is provided by which shorter-term (ﬁve
years or less) relationships without children, real property or many assets
may be terminated if both parties consent; but a formal judicial proceeding
will be required to end most domestic partnerships, at which property issues
will be decided under California’s community property rules, support will
be considered, and all issues concerning custody and support of children
adjudicated (ibid.: § 299). This marks a substantial departure from the
system that now exists, in which partnerships may be dissolved by notice,
hence the warnings being mailed to all current partners that they must ﬁle a
Notice of Termination before January 1, 2005 or their relationship will be
transformed into one involving many more beneﬁts but also substantially
more obligations.
Finally, the California legislation requires couples entering domestic part-
nerships to agree to continuing jurisdiction by the California courts over
dissolution of their relationship, even if one or both should move out of the
state—an obvious attempt to avoid the conﬂict of laws problems described
in the previous section (ibid.: § 298 (c)(3)).
In sum, the legal landscape for cohabitants has become much more com-
plicated with the passage of new partnership statutes and other status-based
regimes with varying provisions, some exclusive to same-sex couples and
some not, varying beneﬁts and a variety of interstate recognition schemes.
Partners or spouses will apparently be free to move among Vermont, Mas-
sachusetts, California and New Jersey without losing protection (although
the marital status of Massachusetts couples may not be recognized as such
in other states). At the same time, many domestic partnership arrangements
provide only a limited number of beneﬁts, and many are available only to
limited groups of cohabitants. In Hawaii, New Jersey and California, very
few heterosexuals are eligible. Moreover, unlike Washington’s meretricious
relationships, domestic partner status must be deliberately chosen by going
through the procedure for registration. Thus if one member of a couple
desires to register and the other does not, no protection is available; and
couples are left to whatever other protections may be offered by the state’s
law on cohabitants’ rights. 
In a state like California, the result is a “hybrid” legal regime for cohab-
itants.8 For most heterosexuals (those sixty-two and younger), cohabitants’
rights inter se rest upon and are limited by contract, although a number of
rights against third parties may be available from a domestic partnership
ordinance if one exists in the city or county in which they live and it applies
to opposite-sex couples. Same-sex couples who do not register as domestic
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partners will also be limited to contract-based rights under Marvin when
they dissolve their relationships. By contrast, all of the beneﬁts of marriage
will be conferred in January 2005 upon those who choose to register as
domestic partners.
Under the U.S. federal system, the states are often touted as laboratories
of democracy, allowing experimentation with new arrangements that may
subsequently be adopted in other regions. The new California domestic
partnership law will be an ideal experiment. While some have objected to
conferring beneﬁts upon couples unwilling to undertake the obligations of
marriage, California is now putting people to the choice. Those who now
receive beneﬁts without obligations will need to opt out before January
2005 if they do not want to become economically responsible for one
another’s support or to subject their property to community property rules.
It will be very instructive to see how popular the newly enacted scheme is,
how many new registrants it attracts and how many drop out by New
Year’s Eve 2004. For those who do not secede, the new law will fulﬁll the
purposes of protecting vulnerable parties to the extent the state’s marriage
and divorce law performs this function; and it will fulﬁll the state’s interest
in the privatization of support as well.
D. A MΙLANGE OF RIGHTS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES
In addition to those available to registered domestic partners and spouses
in the few states that confer that status, a number of beneﬁts against third
parties are available to cohabitants in some areas—both to heterosexuals
and to same-sex cohabitants who live in states without domestic partner-
ship or civil union laws or who fail to register their partnerships. As com-
mentators have noted, rights and beneﬁts against third parties may well be
of more importance to working-class and middle-class cohabitants who
have not acquired substantial amounts of property than are rights to prop-
erty and support upon conclusion of their relationship (Blumberg 1981:
1126–27). In some states, beneﬁts against third parties may be conferred
upon cohabitants by a mishmash of remedies derived from case law, statute
or ordinance. In this section, I describe a few of these approaches, in three
areas: (1) beneﬁts from the state, such as workers’ compensation and taxa-
tion; (2) tort claims against third parties, such as for negligent inﬂiction of
emotional distress; and (3) health-related beneﬁts, such as insurance and
health care decision-making power.
1. Beneﬁts from the State
One way in which third-party beneﬁts for cohabitants may be derived is by
courts embracing a functional deﬁnition of the family, which has happened
in some areas with respect to workers’ compensation and unemployment
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insurance. Workers’ compensation statutes are typically written to cover
“dependents” who survive the individual worker. The statutory concern to
provide for dependents who have lost the wage earner upon whom they
depend would seem to dictate that a dependent cohabitant should qualify
for beneﬁts, but courts historically refused recovery by cohabitants on
grounds of public policy (ibid.: 1141). This may be changing. In California,
opposite-sex cohabitants have been recognized as eligible for workers’ com-
pensation survivors beneﬁts since 1979 if they can show that they were
dependent upon the worker at the time of his or her death, and this eligibility
was extended to the same-sex partner of a deceased employee in 1982 (State
v Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board 1979 at 186; Donovan v Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board 1982 at 873). Similarly, although California
courts in the past denied unemployment insurance beneﬁts to cohabitants
who had to relocate for reasons related to their partner’s needs (Norman
v Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 1983), subsequent case law
supports an award of beneﬁts in these circumstances as well (MacGregor v
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 1984). Thus while the recent
California domestic partnership legislation guarantees eligibility for unem-
ployment compensation beneﬁts to same-sex and older heterosexual couples
who register, the case law extends these beneﬁts to a more extensive group
of cohabitants.
Many of the most signiﬁcant government beneﬁts are universally
unavailable to cohabitants, however, because they derive from federal law.
Social Security survivors’ beneﬁts are available only to those who qualify as
spouses as deﬁned by state law (Social Security Act 2003: § 416(h)). Common-
law spouses are eligible under this provision, but Congress hastened to ensure
that same-sex spouses would not qualify for any beneﬁts by providing
that under all federal laws and regulations “the word ‘marriage’ means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife” (Defense of Marriage Act, 1 USC § 7 [2000]). Cases
challenging the denial of Social Security beneﬁts to cohabitants have been
unsuccessful, on the ground that the wage-earner was never legally required
to support his or her surviving cohabitant (Blumberg 1981: 1144–45). This
rationale would no longer apply to registered or married partners in California,
New Jersey, Vermont and Massachusetts, all of whom do have a legal duty
of support. 
Cohabitants also cannot ﬁle joint federal income tax returns, claim one
another as dependents, or take advantage of spousal exclusions from federal
estate and gift taxation (see Chambers 1996: 472–75). State tax beneﬁts are
available now, however, to same-sex couples in Vermont and Massachusetts;
and cohabitants in Arizona may claim one another as dependents on their
state tax forms (Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 43-1001 [2002]). California and New
Jersey have not followed suit, apparently in order to maintain the same ﬁling
status on both state and federal returns.
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2. Tort Claims Against Third Parties
Standing to bring a variety of tort claims—for the wrongful death of a
partner or negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress, for example—has been
conferred by statute upon domestic partners in Hawaii, New Jersey and
California and is available to persons in civil unions in Vermont and same-
sex marriages in Massachusetts. In other states, and for persons who do not
qualify as ofﬁcially recognized partners in those jurisdictions (most hetero-
sexuals), these issues have been fought out in the case law, with different
states reaching opposing conclusions. Tort claims for negligent inﬂiction of
emotional distress (NIED) provide a good example. NIED damage claims
are available in both California and New Jersey to family members who are
at the scene of an accident caused by the defendant’s negligence and witness
the death or serious injury of a close family member (Dillon v Legg 1968;
Portee v Jaffee 1980). But when a heterosexual cohabitant in California
brought such a claim after witnessing his partner’s death in an auto accid-
ent, recovery was denied on the familiar grounds that granting cohabitants
such rights would interfere with the state’s interest in promoting marriage
(Elden v Sheldon 1988 at 586–87).9 The court was also determined to draw
a “bright line rule” that would not require courts to inquire into the details
of an intimate relationship and would prevent extension of NIED claims to
vast numbers of people (ibid. at 587–88). Thus same-sex couples registered as
domestic partners in California may bring these claims, while heterosexual
cohabitants cannot.
By contrast, when a similar case arose in New Jersey, involving a woman
who witnessed the death of her ﬁancé in an auto accident caused by the
defendant’s negligence, the court rejected a bright-line approach based
upon marriage and allowed recovery for NIED by cohabitants who could
show that they were in an intimate and familial relationship, tested by
its duration, mutual dependence and the like (Dunphy v Gregor 1994). The
New Jersey court expressed itself conﬁdent that courts could identify rela-
tionships that entitled the parties to such treatment and disagreed with the
California court that extension of this right would in any way damage the
state’s interest in protecting marriage, pointing out that the prospect of tort
recovery in such a disastrous case would be unlikely to ﬁgure into the deci-
sion whether or not to get married (Dunphy at 379, quoting dissenting judge
in Elden 1988). The inquiry the court must undertake to determine whether
the couple is in a marriage-like relationship is similar to that for identifying
meretricious relationships in Washington. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
has followed similar reasoning in extending a cause of action for loss of
consortium to cohabitants in an intimate familial relationship (Lozoya v
Sanchez 2003).
In sum, the right of cohabitants to sue third parties for injuries to their
relationships is limited and depends upon the state in which they live. Given
the New Jersey court’s insistence upon limiting these claims to cohabitants
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whose relationship mirrors traditional, conventional models of marriage, it
is ironic that the majority of couples who are now in fact protected under
these circumstances are same-sex—a result, apparently, of publicizing and
personalizing their plight after 9/11 and the Diane Whipple dog-mauling case.
3. Health-Related Beneﬁts
The ﬁnal area in which a number of beneﬁts are available from a variety of
noncontract, nonstatus sources is health care. Health insurance coverage of
cohabitants, especially of same-sex partners, is increasingly offered not only
by municipalities and counties to their employees but also by private com-
panies throughout the United States, especially high-tech companies, those
in the entertainment industry and academic institutions, particularly on the
east and west coasts (see Hein 2000: 28–34). The cost of providing this bene-
ﬁt has been fairly low, given the low participation rate, either because fear
of coming out prevents gay and lesbian couples from applying or because
cohabitants are likely each to be employed and thus may have separate
health insurance already (ibid.: 32). Moreover, the net economic cost of the
insurance is greater to cohabitants than to married couples because the bene-
ﬁt is taxed as income to the unmarried (Chambers 1996: 475). Challenges
to exclusion of cohabitants from family health coverage as discrimination
based on either marital status or sexual orientation have generally failed, on
the grounds that married and unmarried couples may be treated differently
since the latter have no legal duty of mutual support (see, e.g., Phillips v
Wisconsin Personnel Commission 1992; see also Christensen 1997: 1375–79).
In one Alaska case, however, the court found that denial of coverage to the
gay male partner of an employee constituted discrimination on the basis of
marital status (Tumeo v University of Alaska 1995).
Health care decision making can also be an important issue for cohab-
itants. It is possible for cohabitants to execute Power of Attorney for Health
Care documents to designate one another in advance as the person to make
decisions, including life and death decisions, in the event of incapacity; but
many fail to do so (Robbennolt & Johnson 1999: 455 and n. 144).10 To address
this common failure to make provision in advance, states have passed health
care surrogate statutes that list, in order of priority, the family members
entitled to make health care decisions, beginning with a spouse and extend-
ing to more distant relatives; but very few states include domestic partners
in such a list and at least one prioritizes them lower than adult children
(ibid.: 426 and n. 69).11 True to its policy of denying rights and beneﬁts to
cohabitants, Illinois considered but then intentionally excluded domestic
partners from the list in that state, for fear that the bill would be politically
unacceptable to the legislature (Closen & Maloney 1995: 491).
Unprotected by statute, cohabitants are left to the courts if they desire to
assert rights in this respect. One especially egregious case in Minnesota
attracted a great deal of attention to this issue. In it, the lesbian partner of
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Sharon Kowalski, who had been incapacitated in an accident, sought both
hospital visitation and the right to be named her partner’s guardian and to
make health care decisions on her behalf (In re Guardianship of Kowalski
1991). However, Sharon’s parents, to whom she had never come out as a
lesbian, succeeded in cutting off her partner’s visitation, being named as her
guardians, and in making health care decisions that placed Sharon in nurs-
ing homes without appropriate rehabilitative services. It took eight years of
litigation for her partner to obtain the right to care for Sharon, concluding
only when the Minnesota appellate court ﬁnally accepted a functional deﬁni-
tion of family and also recognized Sharon’s own rights and preferences in
this matter. In other states, cohabitants may face similar legal battles, par-
ticularly if their authority is not recognized by hostile family members. Of
course, in each of these situations—exclusion of cohabitants from health
care surrogate statutes and court battles like Kowalski—the underlying
purpose of the substitute decision making is defeated, for the partner is
the person most likely to be able to articulate what the incapacitated indi-
vidual would have wanted if she were able. Those who register as partners
or spouses in California, New Jersey, Vermont and Massachusetts are now
protected. Indeed, in all three of the areas described in this section, same-
sex couples are now much more likely to be protected than are heterosexual
cohabitants.
E. COHABITANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN
Finally, signiﬁcant legal consequences can attach to cohabitation with respect
to children. Historically cohabitation was seen and in some states can still
be seen as tantamount to per se unﬁtness and thus grounds to lose custody
of a child after divorce (Jarrett v Jarrett 1980). However, the trend in most
states, with respect to heterosexual sexual behavior at least, is to provide
that a parent’s sexual behavior is relevant only if his or her conduct has an
adverse effect upon the child (see Ellman et al. 1998: 634–37). Gay and lesbian
cohabitants may still face problems relating to both custody and visitation,
though (ibid.; see also Weisberg & Appleton 2002: 856).
Different issues are raised when a cohabiting couple decides to have chil-
dren of their own, especially if the couple is of the same sex. Because rights
concerning children depend largely upon biology, no problem is posed for
cohabiting heterosexuals who decide to have children; rights to custody and
visitation will parallel those afforded to married parents unless one of the
partners has abandoned his or her relationship to the child (cf. Stanley v
Illinois 1972 with Quilloin v Walcott 1978 and Lehr v Robertson 1983). Ser-
ious problems may arise for gay and lesbian parents, however, because of
their inability to have children who are biologically related to both mem-
bers of the cohabiting couple. For example, a cohabitant in the position of
stepparent to his or her partner’s child from a previous relationship does
not have the rights of a stepparent who is married to the child’s natural
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parent and thus must struggle to obtain visitation rights upon dissolution of
the relationship, although stepparents in married relationships are increas-
ingly afforded this right (Chambers 1996: 463–65). 
More severe problems arise when gay or lesbian couples decide to have a
child of their own and accomplish this either by having a lesbian partner
artiﬁcially inseminated or a gay partner enter into a surrogacy agreement
with a third party. Each of these arrangements is fraught with shoals. In
most states, the nonbiological mother of her lesbian partner’s child will be
regarded as a legal stranger to that child, even though she has raised it as
her own and is known as mother to it; upon dissolution, she may be denied
both custody and visitation (see, e.g., Alison D. v Virginia M. 1991; Nancy
S. v Michele G. 1991). Although a few state courts have begun to recognize
de facto or quasi-parental status in these circumstances (see, e.g., E.N.O. v
L.M.M. 1999; V.C. v M.J.B. 2000; In re Guardianship of Olivia J. 2000;
Dalton 2003: 316–19), most courts still refuse to recognize a functional, or
de facto, deﬁnition of parenthood. Moreover, while the child of a married
woman produced by artiﬁcial insemination with the consent of her husband
will automatically be presumed to be that of her husband and listed as
such on the birth certiﬁcate, artiﬁcial insemination may confer rights upon
the biological father of a lesbian couple’s child (Chambers 1996: 467–68).
Sperm donors have asserted rights against lesbian mothers with some
success (see, e.g., Thomas S. v Robin Y. 1994). Moreover, gay males seeking
to have a child that is biologically related to at least one of them may face
many problems enforcing surrogacy contracts and cutting off the rights of
the surrogate mother to custody and visitation (see, e.g., In the Matter of
Baby M 1988).
Many same-sex couples choose to adopt their children, and this route is
now possible in most states. Only Florida has a longstanding statutory ban
on adoption by homosexuals, although it permits them to serve as foster
parents; this prohibition was recently upheld against an equal protection
challenge in federal court (Lofton v Kearney 2004). Mississippi and Utah
have recently added prohibitions against adoption by homosexuals to their
law, while New Hampshire dropped a similar prohibition in 1999 (Miss
Code § 93-17-3 [2003]; Utah Code Ann § 78-30-2 [2002]; NH Rev Stat §
170-B: 4 [1999]; see also Cooper 2004). However, co-parent adoption, which
would protect the rights of both partners to their child, is unavailable in
about half the states. A 2002 survey of state adoption laws showed that
second-parent adoptions had been approved by courts in twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia (although the right to do so is only really
secure in the handful of states with afﬁrmative supreme court rulings on
the issue), while twenty-six states have explicitly disapproved the practice
(Lambda Legal 2002). Moreover, second-parent adoption procedures are
costly, intrusive and risky; and a successful outcome results in a family in
which the co-parents are legal strangers to one another, while most family
beneﬁts depend upon spousal status (Dalton 2001: 211–15).
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This brief summary simply points to some of the recurring problems that
may threaten cohabitants’ rights to their children, and here the main dis-
tinction is the sexual orientation of the cohabiting parents. Although recent
developments—for example, the increased approval of co-parent adoption
by gay and lesbian parents—have improved the situation to some extent,
severe problems remain which may threaten the security of the parent-child
relationship of gay and lesbian couples. Some but not all of these problems
are relieved by entering into domestic partnerships or civil unions in states
where they are available.
III. CONCLUSIONS
As is clear from this discussion, the law concerning cohabitants’ rights
in the United States varies immensely from state to state and by sexual
orientation; it is also rapidly changing in many respects. There is now a
substantial history of attempts by the courts to protect vulnerable parties
in cohabiting relationships. The case law of common-law marriage and the
equitable doctrines used to address injustices resulting from cohabitants’
dependence upon one another show that many courts have been uneasy
with those injustices and determined to remedy them for a long time. It was
only during the late 1970s and 1980s, however, that this unease led to the
development of cohabitants’ rights cases. The ﬁrst of these extended rights
based upon contract, express or implied. This approach offered some help
to vulnerable parties at the end of cohabiting relationships but has proved
inadequate, as courts have insisted upon ﬁnding express contracts and have
refused to imply contracts in the absence of direct evidence of agreement.
The state of Washington’s meretricious relationship doctrine is better in
this respect, looking ﬁrst for the characteristics of a relationship of inter-
dependence and then imposing property distribution remedies upon cohab-
itants at the end of their relationships even if they are unwilling. Developed
by the courts to protect heterosexual cohabitants, both California’s contract
approach and Washington’s meretricious relationship scheme were then
extended to same-sex couples in the case law. Neither approach, however,
addresses rights against third parties, whether it be the state or an employer
or a tortfeasor, which are often more valuable than rights inter se.
In the 1990s, the focus of cohabitants’ rights shifted to gay and lesbian
couples and their exclusion from marriage. This campaign has resulted in
only one totally successful case thus far (Massachusetts) but has spawned
many and varied domestic partnership schemes, ranging from the limited
remedies contained in Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneﬁciaries Act, the early
California domestic partnership law, and various local ordinances, on the
one hand, to granting all the beneﬁts and obligations of marriage in Vermont
(and by 2005 in California), on the other. In Vermont, Massachusetts and
California, same-sex couples are now well protected; and many assume, or
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hope, that New Jersey will follow California’s example and expand the
beneﬁts available to domestic partners in that state.
The result of all this activity is a rather confusing legal situation, in which
cohabitants’ rights are based upon a mixture of remedies that not only vary
from state to state but also result in intrastate legal regimes based on differ-
ent legal theories and offering a patchwork of remedies from a variety of
sources. An additional result is that same-sex couples are better protected in
many areas than are heterosexual cohabitants.
The system as it now exists is clearly unstable. The various conﬂict of law
problems described above import a built-in instability, as couples who have
been granted either the status or incidents of marriage move from state to
state. The exclusion of heterosexuals from beneﬁts available to gays and
lesbians is another source of instability. As gay cohabitants’ rights origin-
ally developed out of those granted to heterosexuals, the reverse may also
prove true. The inclusion of some heterosexuals within the protections
granted by Hawaii, New Jersey and California now undermines the argument
that “they can always get married” and may provide the basis for an equal
protection challenge to the exclusion of heterosexuals in general.
Some argue that extension of rights to heterosexual cohabitants will pro-
vide incentives not to marry and thus do serious harm to the institution of
marriage. It may be that more heterosexuals would cohabit instead of mar-
rying if the status were given more beneﬁts, but the number of cohabitants
has been increasing rapidly over the last decades despite substantial ﬁnan-
cial disincentives. For whatever reasons, large numbers of people ﬁnd the
institution of marriage lacking, but they forge ties of reliance and inter-
dependence outside its conﬁnes nonetheless. Census data reveal that at least
5.5 million individuals fall into this category, and 41 percent of them have
children whose welfare is affected by failure to recognize their status.
A system of family law should acknowledge the families that actually
exist, particularly in a country that ties so many of the welfare functions
central to life and health to family or spousal status. There is now a growing
acceptance of extending economic beneﬁts to same-sex couples, even in the
face of substantial resistance to allowing them entry into the religious and
cultural tradition of marriage (Harvard Law Review 2003: 2001). Perhaps a
similar acceptance of granting beneﬁts to functional families headed by
unmarried heterosexuals will develop as well. In short, the instability of the
current legal situation opens the possibility of change in many respects.
The ideal situation may turn out to be something like that which obtains
in the Netherlands, a multi-status system that allows both same- and
opposite-sex couples either to marry or to register as domestic partners. Yet
to satisfactorily perform the family law functions of protecting vulnerable
dependent parties and privatizing the costs of welfare, it would still be neces-
sary to impose certain obligations on unregistered long-term cohabitants,
under a system similar to that suggested by the ALI, which mandates both
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property distribution and support upon dissolution of the relationship. If
cohabitants are unwilling to undertake these responsibilities to one another,
they will need to execute contracts to that effect. Although this situation
would also be a “hybrid” in many respects, it would be less confusing than
the one that now exists, where the law may provide, within the same state,
a patchwork of inconsistent remedies to different groups.
cynthia grant bowman, Columbia University, J.D. Northwestern University School
of Law, is Professor of Law and of Gender Studies at Northwestern University in
Chicago, Illinois. She has written widely on family law, domestic violence, sexual har-
assment and abuse and a variety of other topics having to do with law and women.
NOTES
1. Six states abolished common-law marriage between 1875 and 1917, and an addi-
tional sixteen have done so since 1920, primarily out of fears of fraudulent
claims and to protect the institution of marriage (see Bowman 1997: 715 n. 24).
The District of Columbia and ten states—Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and Utah—currently
recognize common-law marriage (ibid.).
2. Despite its position on this issue, Georgia did recognize a contract partitioning
property between two lesbians in Crooke v Gilden (1992).
3. There is some inconsistency in the application of the Illinois rule, however (see,
e.g., Spafford v Coats 1983).
4. Nevada follows a similar approach (see Estin 2001: 1383, citing Western States
Construction, Inc. v Michoff 1992 at 1224–25 and n. 17).
5. One study found that only about one-third of heterosexual committed partners
had wills, though 60 percent of same-sex couples did (Robbennolt & Johnson
1999: 441).
6. The American Law Institute is a group of lawyers, judges and law professors
who study various subject areas of the law and recommend reforms, often in the
form of a model statute; its model laws depend upon subsequent adoption by
state legislatures for authority.
7. The San Francisco City Attorney has also ﬁled suit, maintaining that denial of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates the state constitution’s equal pro-
tection clause (Murphy 2004).
8. For examples of other types of hybrid regimes, see Reppy (2002: 286–90), who
describes states where courts have found, based on express or implied contract,
rights, such as standing to sue in tort, which no contract could impose, as well
as states in which statutes or ordinances confer rights not available under the
state’s contract-based law of cohabitants’ rights. Blumberg (2001: 1294) also
describes states that follow contract rubric but make awards that cannot be
justiﬁed under contract law.
9. California courts have followed similar reasoning in denying standing to sue for
the wrongful death of a cohabitant, noting that to extend the action beyond the
decedent’s heirs would be the equivalent of bringing back common-law marriage
(Welch v State of California 2000 at 433).
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
148 LAW & POLICY January 2004
10. In the Minnesota study, 26.7 percent of opposite-sex cohabitants and 71.1 percent
of same-sex cohabitants designated their partners as surrogate health care deci-
sion makers (Robbennolt & Johnson 1999: 455 and n. 144).
11. Robbennolt & Johnson (426) describe a New Mexico statute that includes an
“individual in a long-term relationship of indeﬁnite duration . . . [who] has
demonstrated an actual commitment to the patient similar to the commitment
of a spouse and in which the individual and the patient consider themselves to
be responsible for each other’s well-being” and refer to Delaware and Maine
statutes possibly allowing a cohabitant to serve as a surrogate but only if listed
family members are unavailable. Arizona statute law prioritizes domestic partners
below adult children of the patient (ibid.: 426 and n. 69).
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